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INTRODUCTION

August 16, 2010 is a date that very likely will be remembered for years to
come by anyone practicing products liability law in South Carolina. The South
Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Branham v. FordMotor Co.1 is thought to
be among the most substantial contributions to products liability law in this state

1.

390 S.C. 203, 701 S.E.2d 5 (2010).

781
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in the last three or more decades.2 In the case, the court redefined, clarified, and
reaffirmed many areas of South Carolina's substantive products liability law,
evidentiary rules in products liability cases, and procedural rules for South
Carolina's courts.
Branham v. Ford Motor Co. was an action brought by Mr. Jesse Branham,
Jr. as guardian ad litem for his son, Jesse Branham, III (Branham). 3 In June of
2001, Branham, who was twelve years old at the time,4 was riding in the back of
Ms. Cheryl Hale's (Hale) 1987 Ford Bronco II when she inadvertently veered
slightly off the road. Hale responded by overcorrecting, and the Bronco II
rolled over.6 An unbuckled Branham was ejected from the vehicle and suffered
brain injuries.7 At trial in Hampton County, South Carolina,8 the jury awarded
Branham $16 million in actual damages and $15 million in punitive damages, 9
and defendant Ford appealed. 10
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided many novel issues,
clarified some murky issues, and reaffirmed both well-founded and possibly
forgotten legal principles in multiple areas of South Carolina law. This Note will
discuss the court's multiple holdings and each of their respective effects on
South Carolina law, focusing on products liability law in particular. After
detailing the relevant history of South Carolina products liability law and the
facts of Branham in Part II, this Note will provide an in-depth analysis of the
substantive products liability issues addressed by the court, as well as their
foreseeable effects. The Note will then discuss the evidentiary and procedural
issues addressed by the court and each of their effects on both products liability
law in South Carolina and general legal practice.

2.
See, e.g., Joel H. Smith & Courtney Crook Shytle, South Carolina Supreme Court
Provides Clarity and Direction in Four Significant Product Liability Cases, WESTLAW J.
AUTOMOTIVE, Sept. 14, 2010, at *1, available at 2010WL3540903 ("For the last 30 years, while

product liability law has been evolving through court decisions and legislative enactments, the
South Carolina appellate courts have been inconsistent or generally silent-until now.").
3. Branham, 390 S.C. at 203, 701 S.E.2d at 5.
4.

Ted Frank, Jesse Branham v. Ford: Bad Mom Hurts Kid, FordBlamed to Tune of $31M,

OVERLAWYERED (Dec. 12, 2006), http://overlawyered.com/2006/12/jesse-branham-v-ford-badmom-hurts-kid-ford-blamed-to-tune-of-3 Im/.
5. Branham, 390 S.C. at 208-09, 701 S.E.2d at 8.
6. Id. at 209, 701 S.E.2d at 8.
7. Id. at 209, 235, 701 S.E.2d at 8, 22.
8. Id. at 209, 701 S.E.2d at 8. Hampton County is known among trial lawyers as one of the
most plaintiff-friendly places in South Carolina to try a case. See Smith & Shytle, supra note 2.
9. Branham, 390 S.C. at 208, 701 S.E.2d at 7.
10. Id. at 209, 701 S.E.2d at 8.
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

Relevant South CarolinaProducts Liability Law Priorto Branham

Products liability is defined as "liability for harm to persons or property
caused by the use of or exposure to products."11 South Carolina tort law
recognizes claims for manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning
defects. 12 Additionally, a plaintiff may pursue each of these claims under
multiple theories, such as negligence or strict liability. 13
A plaintiff pursuing a products liability claim under a theory of strict
liability in South Carolina must show:
(1) that he was injured by the product; (2) that the product, at the time of
the accident, was in essentially the same condition as when it left the
hands of the defendant; and (3) that the injury occurred because the
product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user. 14
A plaintiff bringing a claim under a negligence theory must also prove that the
injuries were "proximately caused by a defective condition which could have
been prevented by the defendant by the use of reasonable care." 15
In 1974, the South Carolina General Assembly adopted strict liability of
sellers for harm caused by their products; in enacting the Defective Product Act,
the legislature adopted "nearly verbatim" the language of Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 402A.16 Additionally, the Act expressly incorporated the
comments to section 402A by reference as evidence of legislative intent.17 For
years, this Act has been the source of products liability law in South Carolina.18
However, as this Note will discuss, this is no longer the case.

11.

F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE SOUTH CAROLINA LAW OF TORTS 251

(3d ed. 2004).
12. Id. at 297.
13. See id. at 255-97. The authors also mention theories of liability based on warranty, id. at
258, improvement to realty, id. at 283-84, and fraud or other misrepresentation, id. at 295-97.
14. Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 579, 328 S.E.2d 108, 112 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at 671-72 (4th ed. 1971)).
15. HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 11, at 254.

16. Id. at 276 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 to 30 (1976)). The Defective Product Act
codified a theory of strict liability, which assigned responsibility for selling "unreasonably
dangerous" products, even if "[t]he seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product." Id. at 276-77 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (2005)).
17. See id. at 277-78 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (2005)).
18. See, e.g, Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 262, 286 S.E.2d 129, 131 (1982)
("Strict liability in tort for defective products is recognized under § 15-73-10, Code of Laws of
South Carolina (1976)."); Rife v. Hitachi Const. Mach. Co., 363 S.C. 209, 215, 609 S.E.2d 565, 569
(Ct. App. 2005) (citing Code § 15-73-10 as the source for the rule on products liability).
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B. Description of the Facts and Holdingin Branham

The allegedly defective products in Branham stemmed from an 1987 Bronco
II 4x2 manufactured by Ford Motor Co. (Ford) in 1986.19 In 1999, either Hale or
her husband purchased the vehicle for approximately $150 with 137,500 miles
on it.20 Two years later, on June 17, 2001, Hale was driving her daughter and
several other "excited" children including plaintiff Branham, to her house; none
of the passengers were wearing a seat belt.21 While driving-allegedly in clear
weather conditions and at the speed limit-Hale took her eyes off the road to
turn around and quiet the children.22 In doing so, the Bronco II veered toward
the shoulder of the road, and the right tire left the roadway, alerting Hale of her
mistake.23 She overcorrected by turning the wheel back toward the road, which
caused the Bronco II to shake and subsequently to roll over. 24 During the
incident, Branham was thrown from the vehicle and suffered brain injury. 25
Branham, through his father as guardian ad litem, sought damages from Ford
under South Carolina's products liability law for a defective seat belt sleeve and
a defective "handling and stability" design; Branham pursued both allegations
under theories of negligence and strict liability.26 With regard to the seat belt
sleeve negligence claim, Branham claimed that Ford was negligent for having
sold the 1987 Bronco II with defective rear seat belts.27 Although Branham's
amended complaint did not specify the alleged negligence in the design, he did
claim at trial that "Ford was negligent in failing to adequately test the seatbelt
sleeve." 28 Branham also pursued this claim under a theory of strict liability; 29
however, the trial court granted Ford's motion for a directed verdict on the strict
liability claim because it found, as a matter of law, that the seat belt sleeve was
not "unreasonably dangerous to the user at the time of manufacture."30
The heart of Branham's case was the "handling and stability" design defect
claim.31 Branham relied primarily on internal Ford documents and testimony
from two experts-former vice president of Ford, Mr. Thomas Feaheny,
(Feaheny), and Dr. Melvin Richardson (Richardson)-to prove this claim.32
Feaheny testified that the Bronco II was a product of Ford's "YUMA Program,"

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 390 S.C. 203, 208, 701 S.E.2d 5, 7 (2010).
Id. at 208 & n.1, 701 S.E.2d at 7-8 & n.1.
Id. at 208, 701 S.E.2d at 8.
Id.
Id. at 208-09, 701 S.E.2d at 8.
Id. at 209, 701 S.E2d at 8.
Id. at 209, 235, 701 S.E.2d at 8, 22.
Id. at 209, 701 S.E.2d at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 209-10, 701 S.E.2d at 8.
Id. at 210, 701 S.E.2d at 8.
See id. at 212, 701 S.E.2d at 10.
See id. at 213-18, 701 S.E.2d at 10-13.
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a project that began in the late 1970s. 33 Richardson explained that the YUMA
project set out to develop the design of small trucks (such as the Bronco II) and
that the suspension in such trucks was important to their handling and stability, 3 4
"stability index," 35 and center of gravity. The YUMA prototypes for the future
Bronco II initially had MacPherson front suspensions-this was the type of
suspension Ford engineers requested when communicating with Ford
management about how to address early handling and stability issues with the
prototypes.37 According to Feaheny, the MacPherson suspension was the "best,
most feasible suspension from a functional standpoint and also from a cost and
weight standpoint." 38
Ford corporate executives, however, disagreed with the engineers and
Feaheny; they believed the well-promoted, Twin I-Beam suspension should be
used instead of the MacPherson suspension because of the "major marketing
advantage" it served. 39 Feaheny explained his and the engineers' reasons for
disagreeing with the Ford executives' decision-he testified that essentially the
Twin I-Beam suspension was much larger than the MacPherson suspension,
which caused the entire vehicle to be lifted higher.40 This resulted in a higher
center of gravity for the Bronco II and negatively affected the vehicle's
stability.41 Additionally, Feaheny testified that the Twin I-Bean suspension had
a tendency for 'jacking"-the vehicle would "slide out in a severe handling
maneuver," causing "an instantaneous raising of the center of gravity," making
the vehicle more top heavy and increasing "the propensity for rollover." 42

33. Id. at 213, 701 S.E.2d at 10. YUMA was a code name developed by Ford for its study of
small trucks that led to the development of the Ford Ranger and Bronco II. Id.
34. Id. at 213, 215, 701 S.E.2d at 10-11. Richardson explained that "a vehicle with a stable
suspension is [better] able to make a turn in the road" because as a vehicle goes around the turn and
starts to lean over, the tires remain "the same distance apart where they touch the ground." Id. at
213, 701 S.E.2d at 10 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, when a
vehicle with an unstable suspension goes around the same turn, the tires will "scrub" the ground,
which decreases the vehicle's stability and handling. See id. (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 212, 701 S.E.2d at 10. The stability index,-essentially a comparison of a vehicle's
height and width-is a term used to describe a vehicle's overall stability. Id. at 212-13, 701 S.E.2d
at 10.
36. Id. at 213, 701 S.E.2d at 10. Center of gravity relates to the commonly-used description
of a vehicle as "top heavy or stable." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The lower a vehicle's
center of gravity is, the more stable it is, whereas the higher a vehicle's center of gravity, the more
top heavy, or less stable, it is. Id.
37. Id. at 213-14, 701 S.E.2d at 10.
38. Id. at 214, 701 S.E.2d at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. at 215, 701 S.E.2d at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). Since the 1960s, the
Twin I-Beam suspension had been used in Ford's bigger full-sized trucks, and marketing executives
considered it to be "part and parcel of a tough truck." Id.
40. Id. at 214, 701 S.E.2d at 11. The engine had to be lifted approximately two to three
inches to make room for the Twin I-Beam suspension, which necessarily caused the transmission,
the hood, and the seating to be raised, all in order to accommodate the larger suspension. Id.
41. See id.
42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Richardson's testimony bolstered the views expressed by Feaheny; he
testified that use of the Twin I-Beam suspension made the Bronco II
unreasonably dangerous. 43 Richardson testified as to the existence of a
document, dated February 5, 1981, that discussed the stability index of the
Bronco II and potential methods for improvement." The document contained
multiple design alternatives for improving the stabili 7 index from 1.85 to 2.25,
without the development of a new concept vehicle. Ford chose the proposal
that increased the stability index to 2.02. Richardson also testified to a variety
of other Ford documents, including documents discussing how to proceed with
the steering and suspension design following "J" turn testing, 47 the stability
index of the Bronco II prior to the final en ineering sign-off, 4 and the need to
improve the Bronco II during its life cycle. Following Richardson's discussion
of the last document, Branham asked if there were any improvements made to
the Bronco II after its release, and Richardson indicated that the company could
not have made any improvements that would have corrected the defects.
The fact that Hale's Bronco II was two-wheel drive (4x2) was also relevant,
and was discussed in the case. The Bronco II 4x2 model was lighter than the
4x4 model, which resulted in the 4x2 model having a higher center of gravity
and inferior stability as compared to the 4x4.51
In addition to the aforementioned testimony of Feaheny and Richardson,
Branham introduced memoranda and at least one video tape prepared after the
manufacture of Hale's 1987 Bronco 11.52 One memorandum, dated April 14,
1989, dealt with a meeting between three Ford engineers and representatives
from Consumer Reports. 53 The memorandum discussed the engineers' belief
that-to Ford's advantage-they had "clouded" the minds of the Consumer
Reports representatives about the negative aspects of the Bronco II, one of which
was data showing that the Bronco II's rollover rate was three times higher than
that of the Chevrolet S-10 Blazer.54
Through Richardson, Branham introduced a film taped in 1989 comparing
the Bronco II and Chevy S-10 Blazer along with a corresponding report

43. See id.
44. Id. at 215-16, 701 S.E.2d at 11-12.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 216, 701 S.E.2d at 12. Although none of the proposals included a different
suspension, Richardson opined that, with a different suspension, such as the MacPherson, the
Bronco II "could have achieved a stability index of 2.25." Id.
47. Id. at 216-17, 701 S.E.2d at 12. "J"turn testing is a method employed by Ford engineers
to test a vehicle's stability; the vehicle is driven in a straight line and then quickly turned and held at
a predetermined angle "for the remainder of the turn." See id. at 213, 701 S.E.2d at 10.
48. See id. at 217, 701 S.E.2d at 12.
49. See id.
50. Id. (internal quotations marks omitted).
51. Id.
52. See id. at 227-29, 701 S.E.2d at 18-19.
53. Id. at 227-28, 701 S.E.2d at 18.
54. Id.
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indicating that Ford had requested "additional 'J' turn tests" 55 in May of 1989
"for various vehicles, including a 1989 Bronco II 4x4." 56 The tape revealed that
the 1989 Chevy S-10 Blazer handled better than the 1989 Bronco II.57
Richardson also testified to the existence of a document comparing a 1989
Bronco II with a prototype of what became the Ford Explorer.ss The document
discussed the Bronco II's rollover tendency, as shown by an analysis of its past
accident summaries.59 Additionally, another memorandum was introduced that
discussed an accident that occurred in February of 1989, when a Bronco II rolled
over during a test of a prototype antilock braking system; the rollover occurred
while the vehicle was being operated on an ice surface. 60
At the trial in Hampton County, the jury awarded Branham $16 million in
actual damages as well as $15 million in punitive damages. 61 On direct appeal
from the circuit court,62 the South Carolina Supreme Court made the following
conclusions, each of which will be discussed in turn:
*

In products liability design defect cases, South Carolina follows the
view of the Restatement (Third)of Torts that a plaintiff must show a

reasonable alternative design and analyze the alternative design's
reasonableness according to the "risk-utility test;" 63
*

There is no separate "failure to test" cause of action in South
Carolina, other than the failure to design a safe and not
unreasonably dangerous product;64

*

Products liability design defect actions brought under strict liability
and negligence theories share some of the same elements, and a
failure to prove one of the elements common to both, causes both
claims to fail; 65

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
examples
Branham
61.
62.
63.
64.
Part IB.
65.

Id. at 228, 701 S.E.2d at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 228-29, 701 S.E.2d at 18-19.
Id. at 229, 701 S.E.2d at 19. The supreme court noted that these were just a few
of the "post-manufacture" and "post-distribution evidence" introduced by plaintiff
at the trial. Id.
Id. at 208, 701 S.E.2d at 7.
Id.
Id. at 222, 701 S.E.2d at 15; see also discussion infra Part III.A.
Id. at 210, 701 S.E.2d at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also discussion infra
See id. at 210, 701 S.E.2d at 8; see also discussion infra Part III.C.
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*

Evidence not reasonably attainable prior to the distribution of a
product, (i.e., "post-distribution evidence") is inadmissible;66

*

Evidence of "other similar incidents" is allowable, provided that the
evidence is substantially similar and is not post-distribution
evidence; 67

*

Closing arguments may not arouse passion or prejudice in a jury; if
a closing argument arouses passion or prejudice to the point that a
party was denied a fair trial, then a new trial is appropriate;68

*

Evidence of a defendant's net worth and derivations of net worth
are allowable, but likely nothing further; 69

*

A court may not punish a defendant for "harm to others" who are
not a party to the action;70

*

A trial court has the power to realign parties;71

*

For causes of action occurring prior to July 1, 2005, allocation of
fault between joint tortfeasors is improper;72

III. SUBSTANTIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW ADDRESSED IN BRANHAM AND ITS
EFFECT

In 1974, the South Carolina General Assembly adopted "nearly verbatim"
the language

of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A and the

accompanying comments for products liability causes of action.73 Based on this
framework, courts in South Carolina have held that plaintiffs in design defect
cases must show, among other things, that they were injured because of an
unreasonably dangerous product.74

66. Id. at 227; 701 S.E.2d at 17; see also discussion infra Part IV.A.
67. Id. at 232, 701 S.E.2d at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also discussion infra
Part IV.B.
68. See id. at 234-35; 701 S.E.2d at 21-22; see also discussion infra Part IV.C.
69. See id. at 239-41, 701 S.E.2d at 24-25; see also discussion infra Part IV.D.
70. Id. at 238, 701 S.E.2d at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also discussion infra
Part IV.E.
71. See id. at 241-43, 701 S.E.2d at 25-26; see also discussion infra Part IV.F.
72. See id. at 235-37, 701 S.E.2d at 22-23; see also discussion infra Part IV.G.
73. See supranotes 16-17 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 579, 328 S.E.2d 108, 112 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at 671-72 (4th ed. 1971)) (discussing the
elements plaintiffs must show in any products liability action).
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The "Risk-Utility" Test and Evidence of a Reasonable Alternative
Design in Design Defect Actions

Since the adoption of section 15-73-10 through section 15-73-30, courts
have interpreted the unreasonably dangerous product requirement by relying on
the comments to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

From

these comments, South Carolina courts formulated the consumer-expectation test
to determine when a product would be considered unreasonably dangerous.76
The supreme court established the consumer-expectation test in Young v. Tide
77
Craft, Inc., which focused on whether the product in question was more
dangerous than the ordinary consumer would expect it to be. 7 The test evolved,
however, and in 1982 the supreme court considered a balancing test in Claytor v.
General Motors Corp.79 In its analysis of whether the product at issue was
unreasonably dangerous, the court listed many factors, which were essentially
equivalent to the risk-utility test recently adopted in Branham.80
Additionally, while South Carolina courts have never, prior to Branham,
expressly required a feasible or reasonable alternative design as proof of a
product being unreasonably dangerous, on multiple occasions the courts have
noted the absence or existence of a feasible alternative design in their rulings.81

75. See, e.g., Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 264, 286 S.E.2d 129, 131-32
(1982) ("The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition and subsequent
mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed." (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (1965))); Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 471, 242
S.E.2d 671, 680 (1978) ("The question that presents itself is whether the absence of the kill switch
per se rendered the boat dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics." (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

402A cmt. i (1965)) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).
76. See Branham, 390 S.C. at 220, 701 S.E.2d at 14.
77. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
78.

See id. at 471, 242 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A

cmt. i (1965)).
79.

See 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (1982); HUBBARD & FELIX, supranote 11, at

303.
80. Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132 ("[N]umerous factors must be considered,
including the usefulness and desirability of the product, the cost involved for added safety, the
likelihood and potential seriousness of injury, and the obviousness of danger."); see also Branham,
390 S.C. at 225 & n.16, 701 S.E.2d at 16 & n.16 (2010) (citing Claytor, 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d
at 132).
81. Evidence ofa reasonable alternative design has been sufficient to uphold verdicts in favor
of a plaintiff under product liability theories. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equip. Co., 271 S.C.
171, 176, 246 S.E.2d 176, 178 (1978) ("[T]he failure to anticipate the foreseeable use of a catwalk
by placing protective shields on the conveyor rendered the design of the conveyor defective.");
Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 234, 166 S.E.2d 173, 187 (1969) ("Without an adequate
protective knob, the [gearshift] lever was quite capable of piercing the body of any person who
might be thrown upon it, and the jury could reasonably have concluded that the rod presented an
unreasonable risk of injury unless effectively guarded."). Conversely, South Carolina appellate
courts have also noted a plaintiffs lack of evidence of a reasonable alternative design in affirming
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Thus, prior to Branham, South Carolina courts used both the consumerexpectation test and the balancing test to determine whether a product was
unreasonably dangerous, 8 2 but the tests were applied inconsistently and how
much weight should be given to each test was unclear. 83 The South Carolina
Supreme Court in Branham clarified this issue by expressly adopting the riskutility test and its requirement that plaintiffs present a feasible alternative to the
allegedly defective design. 84 Under the new rule, a plaintiff in a products
liability design defect action must: 1) "point to a design flaw" in the allegedly
defective product; 2) "present evidence of a reasonable alternative design"; and
3) "show how his alternative design would have prevented the [allegedly
defective] product from being unreasonably dangerous."85 The risk-utility test
will be employed to show that the alternative design is reasonable as compared
to the allegedly defective design, and the plaintiffs showing "must include
consideration of the costs, safety and functionality associated with the alternative
design." 86 Additionally, the requirements and factors of Branham's formulation
of the risk-utility test are illuminated by previous definitions offered by the
supreme court and the court of appeals. 87
The court in Branham noted that this new rule is in accord with the
Restatement (Third) of Torts.88

In adopting the Restatement view, the court

stated its belief that the new rule is essentially what trial and appellate courts
have been using and is in accord with the trend of products liability law in South
Carolina.89

defense verdicts. See, e.g., Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 546, 462 S.E.2d 321, 330 (Ct.
App. 1995) ("[Plaintiff] Bragg failed to introduce evidence of a feasible design alternative. Bragg's
hydraulics expert conceded the device he designed and advanced as a nondefective alternative was
simply for demonstration purposes and would not work."); Sunvillas Homeowners Ass'n v. Square
D Co., 301 S.C. 330, 334, 391 S.E.2d 868, 870 (Ct. App. 1990) ("[Plaintiff] Sunvillas's expert did
not testify about design alternatives. He did not identify a specific defect in the circuit breaker
which was the result of a manufacturing error by [defendant] Square D. At most the jury would be
left to speculate how Square D failed to exercise due care. The trial court was correct in granting
the directed verdict.").
82. See Branham, 390 S.C. at 218, 701 S.E.2d at 13.
83. See id. at 218-22, 701 S.E.2d at 13-15. See generally HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 11,
at 303 ("The South Carolina [courts] have not articulated a specific test of 'unreasonably
dangerous.' Instead, the cases contain reference to both the expectation test and the risk-benefit
test.").
84. Branham, 390 S.C. at 220, 701 S.E.2d at 14.
85. Id. at 225, 701 S.E.2d at 16.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 218, 701 S.E.2d at 13 (quoting Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C., 259,
265, 286 S.E.2d, 129, 132 (1982)); id. at 218-19, 701 S.E.2d at 13 ("[A] product is unreasonably
dangerous and defective if the danger associated with the use of the product outweighs the utility of
the product." (alteration in original) (quoting Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 543, 462
S.E.2d 321,328 (Ct. App. 1995))).
88.

Id. at 223-24, 701 S.E.2d at 16 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS

§

2(b)

(1998)).
89. Id. at 222, 701 S.E.2d at 15.
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It should be noted, however, that although the court's new rule appears to
simply be an evolution of judicial common law, its effect on the provisions of
the Defective Product Act-which adopted the view of the Restatement
(Second)-wasnot directly resolved by the court and remains unclear. 90
Had the new standard enunciated by the court been in place at the time of
previously decided design defect cases, the outcomes in those cases probably
would not have been affected significantly. Although not identical, the standards
for liability under the Restatement (Second) and the Restatement (Third) are very

similar. 91 Professors James A. Henderson and Aaron D. Twerski assert that
"even [state] courts that apply a consumer-expectation test rarely do so without
tempering it with significant risk-utility balancing."92 This view accurately
describes the test's use in South Carolina, as it had not been the exclusive and
determinative test prior to Branham.93 The Reporters' notes to the Restatement
(Third)bolster this opinion. 94

90. See id. at 220, 701 S.E.2d at 14. The supreme court reasoned that when the General
Assembly enacted South Carolina's version of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) in 1974, it
adopted the comments as indicative of legislative intent. See id. Since then, the Restatement
(Third) was published, and "[t]he third edition effectively moved away from the consumer
expectations test for design defects, and towards a risk-utility test." Id. Because the legislature
directed courts to look to the comments of the Restatement, the court concluded, "We thus believe
the adoption of the risk-utility test in design defect cases in no manner infringes on the Legislature's
presence in this area." Id. In other words, the court concluded that its holding would not infringe
upon the legislative function and that adopting the view of the Restatement (Third) would actually
be in line with legislative intent. See id.
91. For purposes of this analysis, both views essentially boil down to a requirement that the
product have been unreasonably dangerous; the differences arise with respect to the level of proof
required. Compare RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§2

cmt. d (1998) ("[T]he test

is whether a reasonable alternative design would, at reasonable cost, have reduced the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product and, if so, whether the omission of the alternative design by the
seller or a predecessor in the distributive chain rendered the product not reasonably safe."), and id.
cmt. f ("To establish a prima facie case of defect, the plaintiff must prove the availability of a
technologically feasible and practical alternative design that would have reduced or prevented the
plaintiff's harm."), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A(1)

(1965) ("One who sells any

product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused .... ), and id. cmt. g ("The burden of proof
that the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller
is upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion
that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.").
92. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1533 (1992).
93. See, e.g., Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 544, 462 S.E.2d 321, 328 (Ct. App.
1995) ("[I]n South Carolina we balance the utility of the risk inherent in the design of the product
with the magnitude of the risk to determine the reasonableness of the manufacturer's action in
designing the product." (citing Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 265, 286 S.E.2d 129,
132 (1982))).
94.

RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§2

reporters' note cmt. d (1998); see

also Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLuM. L. REv. 1700, 1722 (2003)
("In the view of the Reporters, courts that purport to apply a consumer expectations test largely can
be grouped into one of two categories: those that simply cloak a risk-utility test with consumer
expectations language, and those that emphasize consumer expectations only in the context of
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Practically speaking, it appears that the results of typical products liability
design defect actions will be similar to the results before Branham;
nevertheless, other lingering questions remain to be answered by future
litigation or legislation. The first of these questions involves determining the
role of the consumer-expectation test in future products liability design defect
cases. As discussed above, the consumer-expectation test has not been used as
the exclusive test in South Carolina for quite some time, but it was at the least a
substantial factor in the court's prior decisions. In the post-Branham era,
however, the consumer-expectations test may have a somewhat different role.
In adopting the risk-utility test as the "exclusive test in a products liability
design case," the Branham court explained that the consumer-expectations test
"is ill-suited in design defect cases." 95 Notwithstanding the court's language,
because the consumer-expectations test is folded into the risk-utility test, its
reasoning may continue to inform judicial decisions. The comments to the
Restatement (Third) of Torts-which the supreme court noted are indicative of
legislative intent-are instructive. In particular, one comment addresses the
issue of consumer expectations, stating:
Consumer expectations, standing alone, do not take into account
whether the proposed alternative design could be implemented at
reasonable cost, or whether an alternative design would provide greater
overall safety. Nevertheless, consumer expectations about product
performance and the dangers attendant to product use affect how risks
are perceived and relate to foreseeability and frequency of the risks of
harm, both of which are relevant . . . .

Thus, although consumer

expectations do not constitute an independent standard for judging the
defectiveness of product designs, they may substantially influence or
even be ultimately determinative on risk-utility balancing in judging
whether the omission of a proposed alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe.96
Further confusion remains with respect to the defenses to design defect
products liability actions-specifically, whether assumption of risk or
comparative negligence are viable defenses. The comments to section 402A of
the Restatement (Second), which are included as part of section 15-73-30 of the
South Carolina Code, state that contributory negligence is generally not an
available defense.97 South Carolina has since adopted comparative negligence, 98

product malfunctions that would equally merit an inference of defect under the Restatement's
section 3." (footnote omitted)).
95. Branham 390 S.C. at 220, 701 S.E.2d at 14 (2010).
96.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§ cmt.

g (1998).

97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n. (1965) ("Contributory negligence of
the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect
of the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence."). However, the assumption of
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but the courts have but not ruled on its applicability to the context of design
defect products liability cases. 99 Although the court in Branham did not directly
address the issue, the comments to the Restatement (Third) presumably will be

instructive because they allow comparative negligence to reduce a plaintiffs
recovery and refer to a plaintiffs "misuse, modification, and alteration" of a
product as relevant to the issues of causation, defect, and fault.100
In addition to the points discussed above, other issues need resolution as
well: What will be the effect of the "state of the art" defense? 101 What will
happen to the "heeding presumption" in South Carolina? 102 Will reasonably
alternative desiws be required for manifestly unreasonable designs, 10 3 defective
food products, or prescription drugs and medical devices?105
B.

The "Failureto Test" Claim in Design and ManufacturingDefect Cases

Branham's case centered on his design defect claim with respect to the
Bronco II's suspension,106 but Branham also claimed that Ford was liable under
negligence and strict liability theories for the "defective rear occupant restraint
system" (seat belt sleeve). 10 7 Although Branham did not challenge the design of

risk defense is available to defendants and it can operate as a total bar to a plaintiffs recovery in
products liability actions; the comment explains, "Ifthe user or consumer discovers the defect and is
aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is
injured by it, he is barred from recovery." Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-20 (2005)
(codifying assumption of risk as a defense).
98. See Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 244, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991);
HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 11, at 183.
99. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supra note 11, at 183-86 (providing an extensive review of

South Carolina cases on comparative negligence that shows no instance of a court directly ruling on
the applicability of the doctrine to design defect products liability cases).
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§ 2 cmt. p (1998).

As with assumption

of risk, disproving the element of causation would in effect result in a total bar to recovery. See id.
101. See generally id. cmt. d ("Defendants often seek to defend their product designs on the
ground that the designs conform to the 'state of the art.' The term 'state of the art' has been
variously defined to mean that the product design conforms to industry custom, that it reflects the
safest and most advanced technology developed and in commercial use, or that it reflects
technology at the cutting edge of scientific knowledge.").
102. The "heeding presumption" provides, "Where warning is given, the seller may
reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is
safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. j (1965).
103. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§

2 cmt. e (1998)

("Several courts have suggested that the designs of some products are so manifestly unreasonable,
in that they have low social utility and high degree of danger, that liability should attach even absent
proof of a reasonable alternative design.").
104. See id. cmt. h.
105. See id. § 6.
106. See Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 390 S.C. 203, 212, 701 S.E.2d 5, 10 (2010). The design
defect claims with respect to the Bronco II's suspension resulted in a $31 million jury reward at
trial. See id. at 209, 701 S.E.2d at 8.
107. Id. at 209, 701 S.E.2d at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the seat belt sleeve, he did claim that "Ford was negligent in failing to
adequately test the seat belt sleeve.1os At trial, the strict liability claim was
dismissed, but the negligence claim went forward. 109 On appeal, Ford
successfully argued that in a products liability action "there is no separate
'failure to test claim' apart from the duty to design and manufacture a product
that is not defective and unreasonably dangerous." 110 In accepting this
proposition, the court viewed the failure to test claim as an issue of proximate
cause-if the product was unreasonably dangerous, then under products liability
law, the manufacturer would be liable."' However, if the product was not
unreasonably dangerous, then presumably no amount of testing by the
manufacturer would have prevented the accident.112 Therefore, the defendant's
alleged failure to test could not be considered the proximate cause of the
plaintiff s injuries.113
While this holding is generally in accord with traditional South Carolina
law, it also clarified some ambiguity. More than forty years ago, prior to the
General Assembly's enactment of the products liability laws, in Nelson v.
Coleman Co.,114 the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized a "general rule
that manufacturers have a duty to test and inspect their products."' 15 Some years
later, in Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 116 the supreme court recognized a plaintiffs
failure to test claim, but dismissed it because the underlying design defect was
not the proximate cause of the injury. 17 Because the underlying design defect
claim was dismissed, the court held that the manufacturer's failure to test the
product could not have been the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries.1
Based on this discussion, one could deduce that the failure to test claim would be
incorporated into the design defect claim, but this conclusion was not implicit in
the court's holding. 119
More recently, in Duncan v. FordMotor Co.,120 the South Carolina Court of

Appeals recognized a manufacturer's duty to test and inspect components
incorporated into its products.121 In so doing, the court referenced section 15-73-

108. Id.
109. Id. at 210-11, 701 S.E.2d at 8-9.
110. Id. at 210, 701 S.E.2d at 9.
111. See id.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§ 1 (1998).

112. See Branham, 390 S.C. at 210, 701 S.E.2d at 9 ("[I]f a product is not in a defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, an alleged failure to test cannot be the proximate
cause of an injury.").
113. See id. at 210-11, 701 S.E.2d at 8-9.
114. 249 S.C. 652, 155 S.E.2d 917 (1967).
115. Id. at 657, 155 S.E.2d at 920.
116. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
117. See id. at 470, 242 S.E.2d at 679.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. 385 S.C. 119, 682 S.E.2d 877 (Ct. App. 2009).
121. Id. at 133, 682 S.E.2d at 884 (citing Nelson v. Coleman Co., 249 S.C. 652, 657, 155
S.E.2d 917, 920 (1967)).
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10 of the South Carolina Code, and thereby implied that a manufacturer's duty to
test had been incorporated into current statutory products liability law. 122
Additionally, federal district courts applying South Carolina law have recognized
a manufacturer's duty to test products, though again, not separately from a
products liability claim.123 In Branham, the court cleared up this uncertainty by
expressly adopting Ford's argument that "there is no separate 'failure to test
claim' apart from the duty to design and manufacture a product that is not
defective and unreasonably dangerous." 24
Some uncertainty remains over the implications of the court's rule, however,
such as whether a claim based on a manufacturer's failure to test prescription
drugs and medical devices would be recognized by South Carolina courts.
Presumably, the prohibition on a separate failure to test claim would apply in this
context as well. This prohibition would thus have the potential to negatively
impact plaintiffs' abilities to recover because the failure to test claim has become
an im ortant theory of liability in the prescription drug and medical devices
areas.
As previously discussed in Part III.A, the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Branham formulated the rule for design defect products liability in
accordance with section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. However, section
2 does not apply in the context of prescription drugs and medical devicesrather, section 6 does.126 In section 6, the standard for liability in design defect
actions is similar to that in section 2-both require a showing that the product is
unreasonably dangerous in light of the foreseeable harms and benefits. 127
Consequently, if a court looks to Restatement section 6 in future design defect
products liability cases involving prescription drugs or medical devices, then it
will likely apply the reasoning from Branham and refuse to allow a separate
failure to test claim.

122. See id. at 134, 682 S.E.2d at 884 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (2005)). Although
the court of appeals cited Nelson in support of its position, as previously stated, Nelson was decided
prior to the statutory adoption of products liability law in South Carolina. See supra note 114 and
accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Baughman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 780 F.2d 1131, 1132 (4th Cir. 1986) ("A
manufacturer or assembler who incorporates a defective component part into its finished product
and places the finished product into the stream of commerce is liable for injuries caused by a defect
in the component part. The fact that the manufacturer or assembler did not actually manufacture the
component part is irrelevant, as it has a duty to test and inspect the component before incorporating
it into its product." (citing Nelson, 249 S.C. at 657, 155 S.E.2d at 920).
124. Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 390 S.C. 203, 210, 701 S.E.2d 5, 9 (2010).
125. See, e.g., Brian A. Comer, Ten Takeaways from Branham v. Ford Motor Co., S.C.

PRODS. LIAB. L. BLOG (Aug. 27, 2010, 8:43 AM), http://scproductsliabilitylaw.blogspot.com/
2010/08/ten-takeaways-from-branham-v-ford-motor.html ("[F]ailure to test has become a prevalent
theory, especially in drug and medical device cases." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.

§ 6 (1998).

127. See id. § 2, §6. However, the standard for design defects in prescription drugs and
medical devices in section 6 is somewhat higher-the test asks whether "reasonable health-care
providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug
or medical device for any class of patients." Id. § 6(c) (emphasis added).
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In sum, a future plaintiff may not simply claim a manufacturer is liable for
breaching its duty to test a product; rather, a plaintiff must claim that the
manufacturer breached its duty to design and manufacture a product that is not
defective and unreasonably dangerous to the user, which includes a duty to
conduct reasonable tests.
C.

The Relationship Between Negligence and Strict Liability Claims in
ProductsLiability

As mentioned in the previous section, Branham brought an action for
damages based on strict liability and negligence for a defective seat belt
sleeve.128 In dismissing the strict liability claim but allowing the negligence
claim to go forward, the trial court relied on the South Carolina Court of
Appeals's decision in Bragg,129 which held, "Strict liability and negligence are
not mutually exclusive theories of recovery . .. and failure to prove one theory
does not preclude proving the other." 130 Although as a general matter the court
in Branham agreed, it cautioned against such a broad reading and narrowed the
Bragg ruling by stating:
An analytical framework that turns solely on whether strict liability
and negligence are mutually exclusive theories of recovery may miss the
mark..

..

Where one claim is dismissed and a question arises as to the

continuing viability of the companion claim, the critical inquiry is to
ascertain the basis for the dismissal.
The rule to take away from this analysis is quite simple-"If one claim is
dismissed and the basis of the dismissal rests on a common element shared by
the companion claim, the companion claim must also be dismissed."13 1
Essentially, a plaintiff in any strict liability design defect action must prove
three elements-first, "that he was injured by the product"; second, "that the
product, at the time of the accident, was in essentially the same condition as
when it left the hands of the defendant"; and third, "that the injury occurred
because the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user." 132 The only difference with a claim based on a negligence theory is that
the plaintiff must additionally show that the defendant "failed to exercise due

128. Branham, 390 S.C. at 209-10, 701 S.E.2d at 8.
129. Id. at 211, 701 S.E.2d at 9.
130. Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 539, 462 S.E.2d 321, 326 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing
Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co., 684 P.2d 692, 696 (Wash. 1984)).
131. Id. at 211-12, 701 S.E.2d at 9.
132. Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 579, 328 S.E.2d 108, 112 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
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care in some respect."l33 As a result, if the plaintiff does not prove one of the
first three required elements, then neither a claim based on strict liability nor one
based on negligence can succeed. In Branham, the trial court dismissed the
plaintiff s strict liability claim based on an element that was also required for the
plaintiffs negligence claim; thus, the negligence claim should also have

failed. 13 4
Although this rule appears simple enough, it actually clarifies a quite murky
and seemingly inconsistent analysis from the court of appeals in Bragg. In
Bragg, the court held that "it is possible under certain circumstances for a
supplier of products to be held liable under a negligence theory even though the
supplier is not strictly liable." 135 There, the estate of an employee of an electrical
contractor brought a products liability action for damages against the
manufacturer of an aerial device under theories of negligence and strict
liability.13 The trial court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict
with respect to the strict liability claim, but not for the negligence claim.137 The
case went to the jury on the negligence claim, and the jury returned a verdict in
favor of the defendant.138 On appeal, the plaintiff challenged the dismissal of the
strict liability claim, arguing that because the evidence was sufficient to
overcome the directed verdict on the negligence claim, the strict liability claimwith all elements in common-should have survived directed verdict as well. 139
The court of appeals did not agree with the argument.140
Essentially, the court of appeals held that under a theory of negligencealthough "the plaintiff bears the additional burden of demonstrating the
defendant (seller or manufacturer) failed to exercise due care in some respect"the focus of the analysis is on the conduct of the defendant.141 By contrast, the

133. Bragg, 319 S.C. at 539, 462 S.E.2d at 326 (citing Madden, 284 S.C. at 579, 328 S.E.2d at
112).
134. See Branham, 390 S.C. at 212, 701 S.E.2d at 9.
135. Bragg, 319 S.C. at 541, 462 S.E.2d at 327.
136. Id. at 534-35, 462 S.E.2d at 323. The plaintiff also brought suit against the distributor of
the device, but the parties settled and the trial court dismissed the distributor from the case. Id. at
534 & n.1, 462 S.E.2d at 323 & n.1. Additionally, the plaintiff initially claimed that the defendants
breached certain implied warranties, but those were dismissed at trial and were not at issue on
appeal. See id. at 534 & n.2, 462 S.E.2d at 323 & n.2.
137. Id. at 534, 462 S.E.2d at 323.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 538, 426 S.E.2d at 325. The plaintiffs argument was that the decision of the
trial court "to grant the motion for directed verdict on strict liability, while denying the motion for
directed verdict on negligence, was logically inconsistent and reversible error because those claims
[were] virtually identical and require[d] the same proof." Id. In Branham, defendant Ford took a
completely opposite position using essentially the same logic. On appeal, Ford argued that because
the trial court dismissed Branham's strict liability claim, it should also have dismissed his
companion negligence claim. See Branham, 390 S.C. at 209-11, 701 S.E.2d at 8-9.
140. See Bragg, 319 S.C. at 538, 462 S.E.2d at 325.
141. Id. at 539, 426 S.E.2d at 326 (citing Sunvillas Homeowners Ass'n, 301 S.C. 330, 335,
391 S.E.2d 868, 871 (Ct. App. 1990); Madden v. Cox, 284 S.C. 574, 579, 328 S.E.2d 108, 112 (Ct.
App. 1985)).
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court stated that under a strict liability theory in a design defect case, the focus of
the analysis is on the product and whether or not, "as designed, [it] was in an
unreasonably dangerous or defective condition."1 42 In light of these apparently
fundamental differences between strict liability and negligence claims, the court
of appeals concluded that granting "a directed verdict on the strict liability claim
. . . was not, as a matter of law, logically inconsistent with allowing the

negligence claim to be submitted to the jury."1 43 In determining that a
fundamental difference existed between strict liability and negligence theories in
products liability, the court seemed to have perceived a lack of clarity
surrounding the issue.144
The South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Branham, however, clarifies
and simplifies the uncertainties regarding the underlying nature of negligence
and strict liability claims in products liability actions. The Branham rule stands
for the proposition that the core elements of a design defect products liability
claim, whether under a theory of negligence or strict liability, are treated
identically-there is no "shift" in the focus for these elements.145 Under either
theory, Branham requires the same showing, and a failure to prove any of the
core three requirements will automatically result in a rejection of both the
negligence and strict liability claims. 1 46

142. Id. at 540, 462 S.E.2d at 326 (citing Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192,
1196 (4th Cir. 1982)).
143. Id. at 541, 462 S.E.2d at 327.
144. See id. at 537-42, 462 S.E.2d at 325-26. Compare Sunvillas, 301 S.C. at 333, 391
S.E.2d at 870 ("To establish negligence the plaintiff must prove the defendant failed to exercise due
care in some respect. The focus is upon the action of the defendant."), with Madden, 284 S.C. at
579-80, 328 S.E.2d at 112 ("In an action based on strict tort or warranty, plaintiffs [design defect]
case is complete when he has proved the product, as designed, was in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user when it left the control of the defendant, and the defect caused
his injuries. Liability for negligence requires, in addition to the above, proof that the manufacturer
breached its duty to exercise reasonable care to adopt a safe design." (citations omitted)). See
generally John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflection on the Theory and Administration of
Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 824 (1976) ("The confusion
between the strict tort liability theory predicated upon unreasonable danger with the negligence
basis of liability springs from the fundamental similarity underlying both theories of liability which
in turn accounts for the similarity in the language used in the formulations of the separate tests of
liability.").
145. See Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 390 S.C. 203, 211-12, 701 S.E.2d 5, 9 (2010).
146. See id.; Brian A. Comer, Case Brief Branham v. Ford Motor Co., S.C. PRODUCTS
LIABILITY L. BLOG (Aug. 24, 2010, 8:13 AM), http://scproductsliabilitylaw.blogspot.com/
2010/08/case-brief-branham-v-ford-motor-co.html (stating that the element of fault in an action
alleging negligence "is not even reached if a plaintiff cannot prove the predicate element of
defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product").
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IV. OTHER EVIDENTIARY AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES ADDRESSED IN BRANHAM
AND THE EFFECT ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
Along with the substantive design defect products liability law issues
addressed above, the supreme court addressed many other issues in Branham
that will have a significant impact on other aspects of South Carolina products
liability law and the litigation process in general. These important issues include
the limits on various types of admissible evidence in products liability actions,
the trial court's authority to realign parties, and the appropriateness of certain
verdict forms.
A.

Inadmissibilityof "Post-DistributionEvidence"

The general public policy behind the ban on post-distribution evidence is
that manufacturers should be encouraged "to continue to improve their products
in terms of utility and safety free from prior design decisions judged through the
lens of hindsight."1 47 Branham essentially restated the same rule that the court
had established earlier in Claytor-aplaintiff "must show that the product was in
a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller
... and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that
it was then defective, the burden is not sustained."14 "Simply defined," the
Branham court stated, "post-distribution evidence is evidence of facts neither
known nor available at the time of distribution." 49 The rule that follows from
the court's analysis is that a manufacturer must be judged "based on what was
known or 'reasonably attainable' at the time of manufacture."so Moreover, in a
footnote, the court elaborated that its intention for this rule was not to exclude
any evidence created after the date of manufacture, but rather evidence of
knowledge not "reasonably attainable" at the time of distribution. 151
The Branham rule adopts the Restatement (Third) view on post-distribution
evidence.152 Another comment to the Restatement may also shed light on this
rule-comment m states that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that
the "relevant manufacturing community" knew or should have known of the
particular risk, 153 and further, that a manufacturer is not liable for unforeseeable

147. Branham, 390 S.C. at 230, 701 S.E.2d at 19.
148. Id. at 226, 701 S.E.2d at 17 (quoting Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 S.C. 259, 264,
286 S.E.2d at 131-32 (1982)) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Branham, 390 S.C. at 227, 701 S.E.2d at 17.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 227 n.17, 701 S.E.2d at 18 n.17 ("If information on a product is reasonably
attainable, then a manufacturer is charged with such knowledge at the time of manufacture. The
rule prohibiting the introduction of post-distribution evidence does not permit a manufacturer to
turn a blind eye to reasonably available information regarding the safety or danger of its product.").
152. See id. at 227 & n.17, 701 S.E.2d at 17-18 & n.17 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

TORTS §2 cmt. a (1998)).
153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. m (1998).
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harms.154 The comment goes on, however, to establish that sellers bear a
"responsibility to perform reasonable testing . . . to discover risks and riskavoidance measures that such testing would reveal." 5 Also, sellers will be
"charged with knowledge of what reasonable testing would reveal."156 While the
court in Branham did not expressly cite to comment m, the decision's
implication is that South Carolina courts may charge manufacturers with the
knowled e of risks and risk-avoidance measures that reasonable testing would
reveal.
B. Evidence of "Other Similar Incidents"

The court in Branham also clarified the rules on the admissibility of
evidence of "other similar incidents." 5 8
In 2005, in Whaley v. CSX
Transportation,Inc.,159 the South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated the general
rule that "[e]vidence of similar accidents, transactions, or happenings is
admissible in South Carolina where there is some special relation between them
tending to prove or disprove some fact in dispute." 60 The court, noting the
potential for this type of evidence to be "highly prejudicial,"1 61 set the standard
for admissability of evidence of other similar incidents-plaintiffs "must present
a factual foundation for the court to determine that the other accidents were
substantially similar to the accident at issue." 16 2 Most recently, in a case decided
the same year as Branham, the South Carolina Supreme Court elaborated on this
standard in Watson v. Ford Motor Co.163 The Watson court set forth the
following factors to determine whether evidence satisfies the "substantially
similar" standard-"(1) the products are similar; (2) the alleged defect is similar;
(3) causation related to the defect in the other incidents; and (4) exclusion of all
reasonable secondary explanations for the cause of other incidents."164

154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. As discussed in Part IJJ.B, this is not to say that a cause of action exists against a
manufacturer in a design defect case for failing to test its product, but only that a plaintiff may
charge the manufacturer with the knowledge that reasonable testing would have revealed. This
knowledge could then be used in the risk-utility analysis to determine whether the product was
unreasonably dangerous to the user at the time that it left the manufacturer's hands.
158. Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 390 S.C. 203, 232, 701 S.E.2d 5, 20 (2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 230-34, 701 S.E.2d at 19-21.
159. 362 S.C. 456, 609 S.E.2d 286 (2005).
160. Id. at 483, 609 S.E.2d at 300 (citing Brewer v. Morris, 269 S.C. 607, 610, 239 S.E.2d
318, 319 (1977)).
161. Id.
162. Id. (quoting Buckman v. Bombardier Corp., 893 F. Supp. 547, 552 (E.D.N.C. 1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
163. 389 S.C. 434, 699 S.E.2d 169 (2010).
164. Id. at 453, 699 S.E.2d at 179 (citing Buckman, 893 F. Supp. at 552). In Branham,
Branham introduced evidence at trial that compared the handling of the Chevy S-10 Blazer to the
handling of the Bronco II. See Branham v. Ford Motor Co., 390 S.C. 203, 227-28, 701 S.E.2d 5, 18
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In light of its recent holding on post-distribution evidence in Watson, the
court in Branham added the following clarification-even if evidence is
sufficient to meet the substantially similar threshold, "[p]ost-manufacture
evidence of similar incidents is not admissible to prove liability."1 65
Substantially similar pre-distribution evidence, however, should be admissible;
the court couched this allowance by noting that ruling on objections to the
introduction of other similar incidents is within the trial court's discretion due to
"its potential to be 'highly prejudicial,' thereby implicating Rule 403, SCRE."1 6 6
In Branham, the court applied the substantially similar standard and used the
factors delineated in Watson to determine whether admission of the plaintiffs
evidence of other similar incidents was appropriate.167 For example, where the
precise cause of the accident was unknown, the court concluded, "Bronco II
rollover accident data [prior to the distribution date] has relevance when
compared to rollover accident data of other vehicles in class. This relevance is
linked directly to Branham's claim that the design of the Bronco II caused it to
have an unreasonably dangerous tendency to rollover." 168 Finally, the court in
Branham noted that the admissibility of pre-manufacture rollover data is
necessary in light of the risk-utility test for products liability design defect
cases. 16 9 Provided that the substantially similar threshold is met, this presumably
means that pre-manufacture rollover data would be relevant to the risk-utility
test.
C.

The Appropriatenessof ClosingArguments

In Branham, the plaintiffs closing argument relied heavily on improper
evidence and essentially asked the jur to punish the defendant for the hardships
it had caused the plaintiff and others.
In formulating the rule for how to treat

(2010). To have satisfied the substantially similar standard for the admission of this evidence,
Branham would have had to show that-(1) the Bronco II was similar to the Chevy S-10; (2) the
defective suspension in the Bronco II was similar to the the allegedly defective suspension in the
Chevy S-10; (3) the defective suspension in the Bronco II and in the Chevy S-10 caused the
rollovers; and (4) one could not reasonably argue that another defective component caused the
rollovers. See id at 231-34, 701 S.E.2d at 20-21 (citing Watson, 389 S.C. at 453, 699 S.E.2d at
179).
165. Branham, 390 S.C. at 231, 701 S.E.2d at 20. Additionally, the post-manufacture
evidence in Branham constituted post-distribution evidence because the distribution and the
manufacture of the Bronco II both occurred in 1986. See id at 229-30, 701 S.E.2d at 19.
166. Id. at 232, 701 S.E.2d at 20; see also S.C. R. EvID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded ifits probative value is substantiallyoutweighed by the dangerof unfairprejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." (emphasis added)).
167. See Branham, 390 S.C. at 230-34, 701 S.E.2d at 19-21.
168. Id. at 233, 701 S.E.2d at 21.
169. Id. at 234, 701 S.E.2d at 21.
170. See id. at 234-35, 701 S.E.2d at 21-22. For example, at one point Branham's counsel
stated, "This is how Ford looks at this. That little bit of thirty people being killed every year didn't
matter." Id at 234, 701 S.E.2d at 21. At another point during its closing argument, plaintiffs
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these types of closing arguments, the South Carolina Supreme Court cited two
court of appeals cases

-a

1984 case, Gathers v. Harris Teeter Supermarket,

Inc.,172 and a 1996 case, Scoggins v. McClellion.173 In Gathers, the court of
appeals stated, "In a closing argument to the jury, an attorney may not make such
remarks which are unfairly calculated to arouse passion or prejudice."l 74
Additionally, the court in Scoggins stated, "The test for granting a new trial on
the basis of improper closing argument by opposing counsel is whether the
complaining party was prejudiced to the extent that he or she was denied a fair
trial."l75 The supreme court in Branham quoted these rules and concluded that
the plaintiff's closing argument "was designed to inflame and prejudice the
jury,"l76 and that it "invited the jury to base its verdict on passion rather than
reason."1 77 Consequently, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to
show that the defendant had been denied a fair trial because of plaintiff's closing
argument, and it remanded the case for a new trial. 179
D. Admissibility ofEvidence Relating to Defendant's Wealth

Determining the admissibility of evidence relating to a defendant's wealth is
a murky endeavor in South Carolina, even after the Branham decision. In
Branham, the court first made it clear that, given the potential of punitive
damages to infringe on a defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court is the ultimate "arbiter of
determining what financial evidence is proper in assessing punitive damages."so
After reviewing the relevant United States Supreme Court cases on the issue, the
Branham court concluded that in the context of punitive damages, "[e]vidence

counsel stated "Branham is here today with a brain injury and six hundred other people, or however
many it is, lost their lives, and ... have extremely serious injuries. We believe that you should tell
Ford Motor Company what you think about this kind of thing." Id. at 235, 701 S.E.2d at 22.
171. See id. at 234-35, 701 S.E.2d at 21-22.
172. 282 S.C. 220, 317 S.E.2d. 748 (Ct. App. 1984).
173. 321 S.C. 264, 468 S.E.2d 12 (Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam).
174. Gathers, 282 S.C. at 231, 317 S.E.2d at 755 (citing Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Wilson-Avery,
Inc., 156 S.E.2d 152, 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967); Shell Oil Co. v. Pou, 204 So. 2d 155, 157 (Miss.
1967); Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Johnson, 419 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. 1967)).
175. Scoggins, 321 S.C. at 269, 468 S.E.2d at 15 (citing State v. Durden, 264 S.C. 86, 93, 212
S.E.2d 587, 590-91 (1975)).
176. Branham, 390 S.C. at 234, 701 S.E.2d at 21.
177. Id. at 235, 701 S.E.2d at 22.
178. Id. (citing Scoggins, 321 S.C. at 269, 468 S.E.2d at 15).
179. Id. at 243, 701 S.E.2d at 26. The supreme court seemed to find many of the
inflammatory and prejudicial statements made by plaintiffs counsel during its closing argument
particularly reprehensible, stating, "It is unmistakable that the closing argument relied heavily on
inadmissible evidence. . . . [M]uch of the prejudice resulting from the improper evidence was
merged in closing argument with Branham's pursuit of punitive damages in requesting that the jury
punish Ford for harm to Branham and others." Id. at 235, 701 S.E.2d at 22.
180. Id. at 239-40, 701 S.E.2d at 24-25; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
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concerning net worth appears the safest harbor"181 because Supreme Court
jurisprudence "militates against venturing beyond net worth and extrapolations
from net worth." 182 Therefore, the court ultimately held that a plaintiff may
introduce evidence of a defendant's net worth and extrapolations thereof, but not
evidence of the salaries and compensation paid to a defendant's corporation.183
Because "Branham went far beyond the pale in submitting evidence of Ford's
senior management compensation" disguised as a picture of the defendant's
financial condition, the supreme court concluded that admission of such
evidence "was error and highly prejudicial." 184
E. Punishinga Defendantfor "Harm to Others"

While the court held that the trial court properly submitted the issue of
punitive damages to the jury, it agreed with Ford that the jury's $15 million
punitive damages award could not withstand constitutional scrutiny.185 The
court observed that the prejudice resulting from the improper allowance of postmanufacture evidence, especially in the pursuit of punitive damages, was
perhaps most clearly shown by the repeated urgings of Branham's counsel for
the jury to punish Ford for the harm done to Branham and to others.186
Previously, in Durham v. Vinson, 187 the supreme court held that a punitive
damages award was improper where the trial court had "allowed the jury to
punish [a defendant] for a bad act unrelated to his actions toward [the
plaintiff]."
Even though the trial court in Branham "charged the jury not to
punish Ford for other 'conduct,"' 1 89 the instruction still "invited the jury to
punish Ford for all Bronco rollover deaths and injuries."1 90 Consequently, the

181. Branham, 390 S.C. at 240, 701 S.E.2d at 25. The South Carolina Supreme Court noted,
'Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property. . . . [A]nd the
presentation of evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will use their
verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local presences."
Id. at 239, 701 S.E.2d at 24 (quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, the court quoted cautionary language from State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), which stated that

"reference to [the defendant's] assets . . . ha[s] little to do with the actual harm sustained by the
[plaintiff]." Branham, 390 S.C. at 240, 701 S.E.2d at 25 (alterations and omission in original)
(quoting State Farm, 538 U.S. at 427) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182. Branham, 390 S.C. at 240, 701 S.E.2d at 25 (citing State Farm,538 U.S. at 427).
183. See id. at 240-41, 701 S.E.2d at 25.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 237-38, 701 S.E.2d at 23. Importantly, however, the supreme court expressly
declined to address whether the damages awards were excessive because it remanded the case for a
new trial. Id. at 237, 701 S.E.2d at 23.
186. Id. at 238, 701 S.E.2d at 23.
187. 360 S.C. 639, 602 S.E.2d 760 (2004).
188. Id. at 653, 602 S.E.2d at 767.
189. Branham, 390 S.C. at 238, 701 S.E.2d at 24.
190. Id. at 239, 701 S.E.2d at 24.
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court concluded that the jury charge in Branham ran afoul of Durham's "harm to
others prohibition." 91
F. Courts'Authorityto Align Parties

In addition to bringing an action against Ford, Branham also brought suit
against the driver of the Bronco II, Hale.192 Hoping not to share the limited
number of peremptory jury strikes, Ford requested that the defendant Hale be
realigned as a plaintiff. The trial court refused, even though Ford was clearly
the "only bonafide defendant."1 94
Although the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to realign Hale
was not preserved for review, the South Carolina Supreme Court nevertheless
addressed Ford's realignment challenge because it presented a "novel issue."1 95
Moreover, it expressly held that "[t]rial judges in South Carolina have the
authority to realign parties." 196 The court reasoned that a trial court has this
authority under Rule 21 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which
provides for the joinder of parties,197 and also has "inherent authority to manage
and conduct a trial."198 Rule 21 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
has the same purpose as Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 199
which the federal courts have repeatedly interpreted as granting them authority to

191. Id. at 238-39, 701 S.E.2d at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Phillip
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2006) ("[T]he Constitution's Due Process Clause
forbids a State to use a punitive damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon
nonparties or those whom they directly represent, i.e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are,
essentially, strangers to the litigation.").
192. Branham, 390 S.C. at 209, 701 S.E.2d at 8.
193. See id. at 241, 701 S.E.2d at 25.
194. Id. Examples of conduct by counsel for Hale and Branham at trial demonstrate that
although Hale was named as a codefendant, her interests clearly were more aligned with the
plaintiff than with Ford. See id. at 241-42, 701 S.E.2d at 25. See generally Ted Frank, Update:
Branham v. Ford, OVERLAWYERED (Aug. 19, 2010), http://overlawyered.com/2010/08/updatebranham-v-ford/ ("Though Hale was a co-defendant, she cooperated with the plaintiffs throughout
the trial in their case against Ford, even sitting at the plaintiffs table; but because the judge
classified Hale as a co-defendant, it meant that Hale got half of the [peremptory] challenges of the
'defense."').
195. Branham, 390 S.C. at 241, 701 S.E.2d at 25. The court's stated purpose in doing so was
"in the hope that [its] speaking to the matter [would] aid the bench and bar." Id.
196. Id. at 242, 701 S.E.2d at 26.
197. See id. ("Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of
the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a party may be severed and proceeded
with separately." (quoting S.C. R. CIV. P. 21)).
198. Id.
199. See FED. R. Civ. P. 21 ("Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing an action.
On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court
may also sever any claim against a party.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol62/iss4/10

24

White: Products Liability Law for Design Defects in South Carolina: The

2011]

PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW FOR DESIGN DEFECTS

805

realign parties.200 Additionally, the court found the Georgia Supreme Court's
decision in Cawthon v. Waco Fire & CasualtyInsurance Co.201 to be particularly
instructive on the issue. 2 0 2 In Cawthon, the trial court stated that it lacked
authority to realign the parties after a codefendant contended that it would be
prejudiced by having to share jury strikes. 203 As was the case in Branham, one
codefendant's interests were more aligned with the plaintiff than with the other
codefendant.204 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court, relying on Georgia's
version of Rule 21, held that "trial courts . . . have the discretion to realign
parties in the interest ofjustice."205 The court in Branham expressly adopted the
Georgia's court's reasoning and defined the appropriate standard of review"The decision whether to realign the parties lies within the sound discretion of
the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse
of discretion and resulting prejudice." 206
G. Verdict Forms with Joint Tortfeasors

The Branham court's holding regarding verdict forms with joint tortfeasors
is somewhat unclear. When the accident occurred in 2001, South Carolina law
held multiple tortfeasors to be jointly and severally liable for any and all
damages. 20 It follows that determining the relative fault between the defendants
was not relevant to finding that the defendants were jointly and severally
liable-any apportionment of fault between defendants Ford and Hale would not
have affected the plaintiff s ability to collect on a judgment.20 8

200. Branham, 390 S.C. at 242, 701 S.E.2d at 26; see also, e.g., In-Tech Mktg. Inc. v. Hasbro,
Inc., 685 F. Supp. 436, 442 n.19 (D.N.J. 1988) ("Rule 21 permits this Court, sua sponte to realign
any party at any time."); First Nat'1 Bank of Shawnee Mission v. Roeland Park State Bank & Trust
Co., 357 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D. Kan. 1973) ("Pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court may order a realignment of the parties on such terms as are just." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
201. 386 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. 1989).
202. Branham, 390 S.C. at 243, 701 S.E.2d at 26.
203. Cawthon, 386 S.E.2d at 32-33.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 33.
206. Branham, 390 S.C. at 243, 701 S.E.2d at 26.
207. Id. at 235-36, 701 S.E.2d at 22; see also id. at 236 n.21, 701 S.E.2d at 22 n.21 ("A
provision applicable in 2001 provided that '[i]n determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the
entire liability . . . [,] their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered."' (alterations and
omission in original) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-30 (2005))).
208. See id. at 235-36, 701 S.E.2d at 22-23. Had the accident in Branham occurred after July
2005, however, apportionment of fault between the defendants probably would have been
appropriate. See generally id. at 236 n.21, 701 S.E.2d at 22 n.21 ("The current version of the
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act became effective for cases arising after July 1, 2005. The
2005 amendment to the Act provides that a 'less than fifty percent' at-fault defendant 'shall only be
liable for that percentage of the indivisible damages determined by the jury."' (quoting S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-38-15(A) (Supp. 2008))).
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Even so, the trial court, over defendant Ford's objection, required that the
jury apportion liability between Hale and Ford using a standard verdict form for
comparative negligence cases.209 The supreme court concluded that this
allocation "served no legitimate purpose" 210 and instead exposed Ford to "the
very real risk that the jury (unaware of joint and several liability principles)
would take a cue from the apportionment question and inflate the actual damage
award to ensure Branham received a full recovery from the one deep-pocket
defendant."2 11 Moreover, the court implied that the amount of actual damages
the ju awarded to Branham was evidence of the verdict form's prejudicial
effect. 212
Thus, for accidents occurring prior to July 1, 2005, a verdict form that asks
the jury to allocate liability between multiple defendants is improper and will
likely constitute reversible error.213 For accidents occurring after July 1, 2005,
however, joint tortfeasors that are less than 50% at fault are only liable for their
relative share of the damages, and a verdict form that asks the jury to allocate
liability among defendants may be proper, as the allocation would serve a
legitimate purpose to the plaintiff.214
V. CONCLUSION

The South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Branham will have a
substantial effect on design defect products liability law in South Carolina for the
foreseeable future. Not only did this case mandate use of the risk-utility test and
the feasible alternative design requirement, but it also clarified the relationship
between negligence and strict liability theories in design defect actions and
expressly declared the unavailability of a separate failure to test claim. Further,
the court established evidentiary and procedural rules that will have a substantial
impact on products liability suits as well as litigation in general.

209. Id. at 235-36, 701 S.E.2d at 22. For example, one of the questions on the verdict form
asked, "Taking the combined negligence that proximately caused the parties' injuries as one
hundred percent (100%), what percentage of that negligence is attributable to Defendant Ford Motor
Company and what percentage is attributable to the Defendant Cheryl Jane Hale?" Id. at 236, 701
S.E.2d at 22.
210. Id. The supreme court easily dismissed the trial court's attempt to explain why it refused
Ford's request for a special verdict form, stating, "The trial court justified the apportionment
question on the basis of a need to ensure that any punitive damage award was supported by a
negligence cause of action, and not the strict liability claim. The trial court's reasoning is not
persuasive." Id.
211. Id. at 237, 701 S.E.2d at 23.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 235, 701 S.E.2d at 22 ("[A] special verdict question may be so defective in its
formulation that its submission results in a prejudicial effect which constitutes reversible error."
(alteration in original) (quoting S.C. Dep't of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 372 S.C. 295,
303, 641 S.E.2d 903, 907-08 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
214. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-38-15(A) (Supp. 2008).
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Although this case shed light on many aspects of South Carolina products
liability law, some areas still need to be clarified and further developed, either
through litigation or by the General Assembly. Regardless, this case represents a
significant turning point in South Carolina design defect products liability law.
J Rhoades White, Jr.
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